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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HARRY SUTTOX and 
F. W. BLACK, doing business as 
BAGER BEAVER ROOFIXG 
CO)fPAXY, 
Petitioners, 
-v•.-
THE INDCSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, and 
CURTIS OWEN RUPP, 
Respondents. 
\ Crum 
No. 9033 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF l<'AC'l'S 
The Eager Beaver Roofing Company contracted with 
one Graber for the application of a roof (Tr. 12). Eager 
Beaver's foreman, Dan Reynolds, hired Glenn Curtis 
and Curtis Owen Rupp to assist in the installation of 
the roof (Tr. 40). On August 27, 1958, which was the 
first day of work, the claimant, Curtis Owen Rupp, was 
burned by hot tar (Tr. 10). Eager Beaver had no insur-
ance coverage so Rupp made claim for compensation 
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under the Workmen's Compensation Act. In a decision 
rendered December 9, 1958, the Industrial Co=i~sion 
found that Curtis Owcn Rupp was an employee of the 
Eager Beaver Roofing Company and that t.he eompany 
was liable for all medical a11d hospital expenses and 
compensation until applicant if' releaHE>d. 
STATEMENT OF 'l'lil<] CASE 
'l'he sok question to be determined by thiH appeal is 
whether the respondent, Curtis Owen Rupp, was an em-
ployee of the petitioner, Eager Beaver Hoofing Com-
pany, or an independent contractor in relation to the 
petitioner. The law io; well ~e11letl as to the definition 
and distinction between an employee and indep<mdent 
contraetor. Ht-ricker v. lndustrial Commission, 55 U. 
603, 188 P. 849; Christervn v. ln.rlustriaJ Commission, 113 
U. 451, 196 P. 2d G02. The Ctah Legislature has defined 
the terms as are found i11 the \Vorkmen's Compensation 
Act, Section 35-1-42, U.C.A. 1953: 
'''" • ~ \Vhere any employer procures any work to 
be done wholly or in part for him by a eontractor 
oYer whose work he retains supervision or con-
trol, and such work is a part or proee~s in the 
tratlo or businc~" of tho employN, such r,onJractor, 
and all persons employed l1y him, and all sub"(~on­
tract.ors under him, and all persons employed by 
any ~uch mbcontractors, shall be deemed, within 
the meaning of this section, employees of such 
original employer. Any person, firm or corpora-
tion engagetl in the performance of work us an in-
dependent co11tractor shall be deemed an employer 
within the meaning of this section. The term 'in-
dependcut contractor,' as herein used, is defined 
to be any person, association or corporation en-
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gng0d in the performance of any work for another, 
11 lw, 11 !til<· 80 engaged, iR independent of the 
emJJ]oyt'r in all that pertains to the execution of 
the work, is not subject to the rule or control of 
the employ0r, i,.; 0n7ag0d only in llw pcrform:mc0 
of a ddiui1 r~ job or pit•(-e of wotk, and i~ subnrdi-
nnt!' to tltl' employe,· only in effee!.ing a rl'sult in 
a<'<·or·dmi('l' with the employer's desig11." 
The l~tah Supreme Court, in the cn~e of Parki,ISUit v. 
Industrial C'UIIii!iissi(ol, 110 n. :l09, In P. 2d 133, after 
quoting the above f!tatute, f!tated: 
"From thesr definitions it Ifl apparent that 
'vhether a workman i~ an 'employee' or an 'inde-
pendent contractor' ifl dependent on (1) whether 
the employer hao;11H' right to control his execution 
of the work, (2) whether the 'vork done or to be 
done i~ a part or procr~s in the trade or busi11css 
of the employer, and ( :l) whether the work done 
or to be done i~ a definite job or piece of work. 
In \Vorkmen'~ Compeno;ation cao;es-the courts have gen-
erally used thefle testR, and mainly number 1, to dctet·-
mine 11·hdher a person is an employee. 
S'L\'l'KM~:X'l' Qli' POL'\TS 
Pomr I. 
EAGER BEAVER ROOFTI\'G CO.MPANY HAD 
THE RIG-HT TO COXTR01. TH~: WORK OF 
CCRTIS 0\VEN RUPP. 
Por:>~T 11. 
WOHK PERFOI-L\'!f<]D OH TO BE PER-
FORJ'dED BY CURTIS OWJ<;X lWPP IS A 
PART OR PROCESS TN 'l'Hl<j TH.1UlE OF 
EAGER BEAVER ROOFING CO.\fPANY. 
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.POINT III. 
Tll.E WORK PERFOR\rBD OR TO BE PER-
FORJviED BY GCRTTS 0\VEN HLPP TS )l"Q'l' 
A DF:FINIT:E: ,TOB OH PliJJCE OF WORK. 
PonrT TV. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SCFFICIENT TO SUP-
POUT TIHj DF:CTSHJ\' OF THE CO}C\flSSIOX. 
ARGL}H~N'l' 
PoiNT L 
F:AG"ER BEAVER ROm'lXG ('(_l\IPA~l HAD 
THF. RIGHT TO CO);TROL THE WORK OF 
CCR'rTS 0\YF.X RCPP. 
One of the factor~ which mu~t be eonsiU.creU. is V~hat 
the intent of the Legislature was in t>n:wtin!! Srd.ion 
35-1-4-2, U.C.A. 1953. In the case of "f'tah Fire Clay 
Cotnpooy ,._ hulu.l'trial C0m111 i.o·8irm, 40 P. 2d 183, the com-
pany contracted with one H. 8. Jamt•s to furnish all 
trucks and drivers to perform transportation and de-
livery service. Upon the injury of one of the drin•rs, the 
court, in recognizing the contract relationship, held that 
the Utah Fire Clay Company had the right to t>xrrcisc 
control on:r the drivers of R. S. James. The court stated: 
"The (]nestion for determination i~. not 11·hether 
H. S. J:llll<'~ was a <.'ontractor, but whether. not-
withstanding till_' contrad relatioilship which is 
clearly shown and whil·l1 mig-ht be characterized by 
some of the elements ineide11t to the relationship 
of independent contractor, it is such a relationship 
as is co>ered and referred to in the first sentence 
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of the quoted section of the statute' as distin-
guished from the status of independent contractor 
defined in the latter part of the flection. Such a 
eontrwt is entirely proper and nol in any ~<'rt~e 
uulawful. 'rhere is not anything in tl1c H\Htute 
which ·would prr~l-<'11\ t11c eompany from l1a1·irll-( 
it~ delivery work done under and punuant to sud1 
contract. arnmgcment. The Legislature, however, 
undettook by tl1is section to provide that work-
men l'llJ-<!11-(('d in certain kinds of contract employ-
ment Hhould han• the benefit of the CompeJISHtion 
Law, and ]JUs provided that such workmen are, 
for tllC purposes of the act, to be regarded as em-
ployees of tile ('ontractee." 
Again the Utah S11premr~ Court i11 tl1e l'n~e ol' A'/I..Qel Y. 
J.ndu3lrial Co-rn.mission of Clah, 22S P. 500, ti'H:<OnNl: 
"~ * ~ The intent ion of I h1; Iir~t part of lhc statute 
evidently waR to prr·YI'lll 11 l'll~lom, whieh was be-
earning prevalent 11 it h cmployl'fH, of parceling out, 
under guise of contrnct~, the work l.o bt> performed 
among many ow-cnllerl ('OntmctorR, while at the 
sume time the employer retained supervision and 
eoutrol of the work. Thi8 custom was clearly un 
ilttempt to eYacle the provisions of the Industrial 
.-'l.d and eonstituted the mischief whid1 tl1e Lcgi,;-
lature sought to remedy. In our opinion it made 
no diange in the general law as it existed before 
tl1c ad was passed, but it was, Jlever·t11<'l<'ss, a sol-
<'mn deelaration of the 1 ,et"i~iatnn• Hnd when eYer 
tlie employer retained superYision and eont.rol of 
tl1e work to he performed, uo matter what rcla-
1 ion he had sought to establish, the workmt'n under 
l1im \YI!re to be deemed his employes." · 
In Yiew of tl1e legislative intcnl, the eourt ~honld take 
a clear vie11 of tbe fads of H1is l'n~e and the practice of 
the roofing industry in trying to <'Vade their responsi-
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bilities under the \Vorkmen 's Compensation Act by {·reat-
ing a subterfuge of the law by attempting to make their 
employees independent coTJtraetors ur1der the guise of a 
contract as set forth in tlw l'ad~ of 1his case. 'T'he Com-
mission, in deciding this case, recognized this practice, for 
it reads on page 50 of thE> transeript as foll<nV"s: 
"\Ve have always looked with ~u01picion on a gen-
eral practice in the roofing industry to contraet 
labor. The usual result is a no-coverage case." 
The Commission based its decision on the right to control, 
for in its decision on page 50 of the transcript, it states: 
"We emphasize the fact that the failure to exer-
cise tho right to ctHJtrol is not controlling. It only 
makes the problem more difficult. In most of the 
cases there iH very little, if any, aduul visual r.on-
trol although the right exists. 
"Vle believe that thif! case is 8i.milar to Pleu Con-
struction Company v. Ind. Com. 121 r. 375, 242 
P. 2d 561, although the evidence in this case is not 
as conclusive on the issue of control .. -\pparcntly, 
there was no actual control exerr.ised hy Eager 
BeaYer Roofii1g Company. H<nv<wor, there is some 
evidence that Reynolds was a foreman and that he 
hired applicant." 
The facts and issue of the Plen Construction case, supra, 
are almost identical with the case at hand. The fol-
lowing is a comparison of the two cases: 
(1) Companies in both cases contracted for the in-
stallation of a roof and the roofers were to be paid by 
the square (Tr. 15). 
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(2) Initial instruet.ionA were given by the companies 
in both cases as to how the roof should be put on ( Tr. 21). 
(3) Tl1e roofers hired an additional man to assist 
them; in the Pleu ('Use a shingler, and in the instant case, 
Rupp, a kettleman ('rr. 31). The hiring in the prineipal 
case lliUS done by l<Jager Beaver·~ foreman, whieh would 
certainly rnalw Hnpp au employee of the company. Thf' 
kstirnony of Olenn C'nrti><, Curtis Owen Hupp and \Ven-
dellilarney wa~ that Blaek, one of the partners of Eager 
Beanr, told them that ReynoJdg waR their foreman (Tr. 
21, 34, 39). Black tried to deny this by qualifying his 
answer and making a play 011 words as to wlmt the defi-
nition or a l'on•maTI is, ag-aiu trying to e1·fldc their regpon-
~ibili(ies under tht' Workmen'~ Compensation Act (Tr. 
46). Reynolds was also gi.-en adYanee payments by F:agc•r 
BeaYer Compauy, showing what a tru~ted l'mployc(' he 
11as ('l'r. 2-l), 'T'his eourt should he extremely critical of 
the position taken hy the petitioner. 
Petitioner, on page 3 of his brief, denied that F:ag,•r 
BeaYer employer! Hupp. EYen if this contention were 
true, it would not weaken the respondents' poHition, for 
in the Pleu ease, the court held tk1t Uw shingler was 
an employee even though the roofers hired him by plaeing 
an ad in the paper, and the I'Ompany had nothing to do 
with the tH'tual hiring. 
( 4) 'l'he additionul man was to he paid out of Hw 
square price that the companies agreed to pay the roof-
ers (Tr. 30). The instant ease CYen goes further, for 
Eager Beaver paid Rupp direct for his time (Tr. 44). 
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(5) JI.Iaterial for the roof was furnished by the com~ 
panies. 'l'he Eager Beaver Company even furnished the 
roofer the use of thei1· trunks, \lhich certainly is an ele-
ment of employment (Tr. 16). 
(6) In either case, there was no set time to report 
for or lean~ work. 
(7) The petitioners in the Pleu ("li~e were at the job 
and exercised w<tual control during the proees» of the 
roofing, while in the prin<'ipal case one of the partners 
was at the Job (Tr. 21) but the daimUTJt was i11jured dur-
ing the morning of the first day's work before there was 
an opportunity for the partner to exereise actual con-
trol. All of the elements of cont.rol 11·C'te present, but 
there wa,; no ne(•csJ>ity to exercise control other than the 
i11itial instructions wllid1 were giYerl. Tf tlw job l1ad pro-
ceeded af! in the Pleu case, and the roof \Hi~ put on wrong 
as in that case, Eager Beaver ""1\"0llld have certainly 
stepped in Ulld exctcised their right. The rtah Supreme 
Court, in the ca~e of Parkinson v.Jn,lu.<lrial Commissio11, 
supra, stated: 
''The most important of the determinatiw~ of the 
relationship bet 1n•en workman and employer i~ 
tbat ol' control. Tbe existence of a potential right 
to control is ,;td1i('iPnt to create the relationship 
even though that· right is in fact lll'H'f (•.-.;ercised. 
Luker Sand & Gra"''l Co. ,., Industrial Commis· 
si011, supra; Ftah Fin' Chty Co. ,-, Industrial 
Corum., 86 Utah 1, 40 P. :!,1183; Annotation 120 
A. L. R. 1031. To determine 11·hethcr the right to 
cOTltrol 0xist~, all facts and cir(';Jm~tances of the 
relationship mu~t be exa'mihed. 'l'he contract be· 
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tween the parties ordinarily does not <:>xpressly 
mention the right of control. And even though it 
expressly abjure's control by the employer, yet 
tbe l'mployei'-cmployee relationship may exi:;t. if in 
l";wt tlie l'ight to control exists." 
'fhe right to l"Ontrol \1"1h preseut and the dceision of tlll' 
IndustriHl ('omrnission should be upheld. 
Pomr II. 
WOHK PEHFOlL\ll<:D OH TO HJ<j PliJR-
fUIL\Jl<jD BY (!LHT18 OWK\ lWPP lS A 
P.\.lt'l' OH Pl\0( '!<:8S IX 'l'lU<: TlL\.Dl~ OF 
Kl.(;.I£H BKl.VJ<:H HOOFIXO CO.JIPAXY. 
'l'hc next fad or to lw em1sidcrcll i~ wh0tlwr th0 work 
performed l•y Hupp 11!1~ a pnrj or pr•w•.'.-'" iu the business 
,1£ .l!:agf'r Bem·er Hoofing Company. Thic: factor is only 
important as to how i: affecj~ the c-OJI!rul aspect, fo1· in 
11tc' Parkinson ca~L', supra, the court said; 
"~ ~ ~If the work to lJe done is a part or pr"l'I'S>' 
of the employer's busint>sf!, it is more probable 
thai the employer would closely supC'lTise Hnlt 
part or proresOt and therefore more probable t.hat 
he has the ri!)."ht to c-ontrol how tlw workman does 
hifl job. • "' "'" 
The Supreme Court of Utah in the Ctah Fire Clay ease, 
supra, in quoting from the Arizona case of Grab10 v. fnilus-
trial Crmuni.<siuu, 290 P. 10:-n, ~tateo:l: 
'·A procures B to do cGJ'tain work for him whid1 
is a part or process in A's trade or bui!iness, mJd 
n•tain~ supervision or control Ol"('r the work, then 
Band all B'~ employees ano:l subeontrartors to the 
Xth degree fll'f', for the purposes of the Comper1-
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.o,ation Act, employees of A, no matter what the 
terms or method of employment or compensation. 
Tt is ohviou~ that were this not so ihc beneficent 
purposes of the aet could and would he easily de-
feated or CVM.dcd hy unscrupulous employers 
thr011gh ihe aid of various dummy intermediaries. 
'l'he ~tatute therefore brushes aside all forms and 
subterfuges and ptovides that one just, ~imple, 
and definite test. If t.lw work be part of the regu-
lar husinef!s of Jhe alleged employer, docs he retai11 
supervision or control thereof 1 ..ill other matters 
are of importailce OII]y as they throw light on this 
q11Cstion.'' 
'!'here if! no doubt that the installation of the roof was 
part of the process or Jradc of ihc ~ager Beaver Roof-
ing Company, for their business is roofing. They entered 
into a contract with Graber for the installation of a 
roof, and did not enter into a coni ract io contract for the 
installation of the roof; in the one case a contract and 
the other case a contract to emJtract. 
PoiNT TTL 
THE WORK PERFORMl<:D OR. TO BE PER-
FORMED BY l'rH.TU3 0\\']!;_:.,.: RUPP TS XOT 
A DEFTNTTJ<j JOB OR PIECE OF WORK 
The definite job tPst, like the part or process test, is 
only important as to "-hat bearing it ha8 on the right 
to controL This h'8t does not mean only whether a per-
son performs a definite joh, for mnn_,. employees do that, 
but whether it is a job that i;; not directly related to the 
employN'f! business, and one for "·hich he would hire 
an independent enntractor to perfurm. The Parkinson 
case, supra, st.utes: 
10 
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''The test of a 'definite job or piece of work' must 
he taken largely with the fact that such work is of 
tlu.~ type that the workman did as part of his inde-
pendent ('1llling, i.0., l-1is 'own business.' CeriHinly 
many employees do a definite job or piece of work. 
In fact any employee does that at a partieular 
time. The definite job meant is something not 
mmally done by the employer a~ part of his busi-
ness but something he usually gets some outside 
party to do. * * *'' 
'l'he petitioner, on page 3 of his brief, takes the position 
that ''Glenn Curtis was engaged only to do a definite 
job and was free from the control of the pa1·tnersl1ip in 
performanee of the work." AlU10ugh the respondent 
does not agree with U1is positimi, the fact still remains 
that Curtis Owen Happ was hired by Eager Beaver's 
foremaa as a kettleman to perform a ministerial task, 
which would certainly not be a definite joL. 
PoiNT IV. 
THE RYJDJ<j:\CE IS SUFFICIENT TO RCP-
PORT 'T'HJ<j lH:iCISIOX OF THE COMMlSSION. 
The "Ctab eases are voluminous on the position taken 
by the Supreme Court of the state in tlu• <'>1se of Park 
Utah Consol. J!ines Company v. Industrial Commission, 
S.J. r. 481, :Jfi P. :.!d 9i2. It was there said: 
"It seem~ daft and unjnristie, certainly malapro-
pos, that this court should be required to repeat-
edly expostulate with legists about principles so 
well establi~l1ei'l, and to so frequently reaffi1m tlmt 
the findings and eondusions of the commission on 
questions of fact arc conclusive, and fiiJa! and arc 
11 
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nat subject to review, " • • and that they cannot 
be disturbed unless it appears as a matter of law 
that they are contrary to law and contrary to the 
evidence. We cannot weigh conflicting evidence, 
nor direct whirll of the two or more reasonable in-
ferences ought to be drawn from evidence not in 
conflict. " " ~ In the determining of facts the 
conclusions of the commission are like the verdict 
of a jury, and will not be interfered with by this 
court when supported by some substantial 
evidence.'' 
As is set forth above, there is sufficient evidence to sup-
port the decision of the commission. 
COXCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court should 
affirm the decision of the Commission. • 
Respectfully submitted 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys far Respondents 
12 
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